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Abstract This paper critically analyses the much discussed judgements of the
Supreme Court of India in the Azadi Bachao Andolan and Vodafone cases. These deci-
sions have generated much discussion, at least in part, because they were instances
where a developing country court has had an opportunity to possibly challenge the
pre-eminence given to investments (existing division) in international tax law. How-
ever, the court ended up relying heavily on the principle of efficiency (a principle
developed to facilitate capital exporting nations) to arrive at its decisions. Although the
court did mention development in the former case, and despite the opportunity to
develop or even discuss it in the latter case, it was overlooked. Also, in both these
cases the court has ruled out its role in creating international tax law or even to
attempt a purposive interpretation. This analysis opines that the principle of efficiency
does not cohere with development and the decisions of the court reify its belief that
investments automatically lead to development. Importantly, it has forgotten that tax
revenues are desperately needed by the state, and therefore it is time for a division
based on equity (entitlements). It is also argued that such a division based on equity
would cohere with the efficiency and therefore be neutral and fair.
Keywords Double taxation agreement  Equity  Efficiency  Coherence 
Entitlements  Development
1 Introduction
With globalisation and the increased flow of capital to developing
countries, it can be said that International Tax Law (ITL) has begun
to emerge from its youthful state. Thus, awareness about its
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deployment is only growing in developing countries. However the
widely read decisions of the Supreme Court (India) in the Azadi
Bachao Andolan1 and Vodafone2 cases have provided a rare opportu-
nity, in fairly quick succession, to analyse the deployment of ITL
within a developing country.
Historically none of the present day ‘‘developing’’3 countries played
any significant role in moulding these tax laws, ‘nor were these laws
made for a globalised world’4; yet the developing countries have had to
play by these very laws. Thus it is widely accepted that to make the
present tax laws balanced (equitable division/inclusive of developing
country perspectives), changes are needed, especially to the principles of
tax division. Importantly, the differing5 underlying ‘‘reasons’’6 adduced
for such an overhaul highlights the ‘‘disparate interests’’ as well.7 The
nature of these interests are best captured in the title to the United
Nations (UN) Double Taxation Model Convention – ‘between Devel-
oped and Developing Countries’. This not only helps contextualize the
debates for an overhaul of international tax laws, it also warns of the
differing interests therein. Hence, it is safe to assume (established later)
that the present international tax division could be skewed in favour of
the main capital exporting nations (efficiency perspective). But, even the
attempts under the auspices of the UN (perceived as a global tax
apparatus8) to help developing countries find additional resources for
1 Union of India and Another v Azadi Bachao Andolan, 56 ITR 563 (2003).
2 Vodafone International Holdings BV v Union of India and Another, 6 SCC 613 (2012).
3 Admittedly there exists various methods/formulas to determine or define a developing country, but it is
generally accepted that it is a continuum concept. Moreover, the scope of this paper would not permit a
discussion about such a criterion. However, developing country, as used here, refers to India or states
similarly situated – where there is a huge requirement for revenues to develop human resources and
infrastructure.
4 The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative points to this reality; refer to, Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD
Publications, Paris, 2013) [5–7] \http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/
addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#page3[.
5 The absence of an equitable division is a matter that needs consideration because the present principles
work only when the flows of capital between the jurisdictions are relatively balanced, and in reality the flows
are unbalanced; refer to, Arthur J Cockfield, Purism and Contextualism within International Tax Law
Analysis: How Traditional Analysis Fails Developing Countries, 5 eJournal of Tax Research (2007) 200–201.
6 The BEPS Report wants changes because in the present globalised context, the rules do not favour
efficiency; refer to, OECD, supra note 4, 35.
7 Asif H Qureshi, Perspectives in International Economic Law – An Eclectic Approach to International
Economic Engagement, in, Asif H Qureshi (ed) Perspectives in International Economic Law (Kluwer Law
International, London, 2002) 27.
8 What started off (1967) as an ad hoc working group with persons acting in their personal capacity has
subsequently become the UN Group of Experts, and finally in 2005 has been upgraded as an UN Committee;
refer to, Michael Lennard, The Purpose and Current Status of the United Nations Tax Work, 14 Asia-Pacific
Tax Bull (2008) 23–24.
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‘‘development’’ does not directly address the issue of an inequitable di-
vision in international taxes.9
Thus, it is important that developing countries play a pro-active role
in reorienting the present tax laws to collect a higher share of the taxes
based on entitlements (here considered as equity). The argument raised
here is that, ‘for such an equitable division, entitlements are to be linked
to the territory and not the person’ (as discussed in Section 3.2). The
present tax laws are not focussed on equity, and although not equating
equity to formulary apportionment, and talks on such apportionment
have not worked. Similarly, for an equitable division to happen, the law
creating process has to become ‘‘participatory and fair’’.10 Incidentally,
the law making through the UN has been sporadic and the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) does not have to
take care of the interests of non-members. Thus using the existing law
making processes to create substantive equity has proved unachievable.
It is in this context the need to create international practice
(requirement of custom) through ‘‘national courts’’11 becomes impor-
tant. This also implies that a re-negotiation of tax treaties or even a
multilateral tax treaty could wait.
As has been noted,12 the success of juridical formalisation is
merely legal organisation giving explicit form to a tendency already
immanent in practice, or it is seen that such rules are backed by
factual situations consonant with them13 as well. Thus, to reorient
tax laws to favour developing country perspectives, there is need for
more developing countries to support such practice (not just through
judicial formalisation, through academic literature and political
support) which relies on a perspective of entitlements linked to
development. Also, such practice would help create a common
understanding of such tendencies or values, and thereby help limit
the indeterminacies attached to legal formalism.
9 It only says, Globalisation should be inclusive and equitable (wording is not categorical), and it calls for
a holistic approach to achieving financing for development; refer to, United Nations, Report of the
International Conference on Financing for Development, A/CONF.198/11, [2]\http://daccess-dds-ny.un.
org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/392/67/PDF/N0239267.pdf?OpenElement[.
10 Fair decisions can be arrived at by making such decisions in an original position and behind a veil of
ignorance; refer to, John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 2nd edn (Columbia University Press, New York, 2005)
304–307.
11 It forms part of the legal structure that could provide legitimacy as well as an evolutionary roadmap;
refer to, Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 7.
12 Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 Hastings L J (1987)
848.
13 Ibid, 849.
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However, if this did not happen, in such situations where the law is
‘‘unsettled’’,14 there would be a tendency among the ‘rising or dominant
groups to impose as official, the social world which sustains their ownworld
vieworwhich favours their interest’.15 The analysis of these two caseswould
show how a paucity of research espousing the cause of ‘‘equity’’ (develop-
ment) has helped ‘‘efficiency’’ occupy centre stage, and also perpetuate such a
perspective.Undoubtedly, this has influencedpolicy discourses in developing
countries as well and the Supreme Court’s reliance on ‘‘efficiency’’16 in the
Vodafone case exemplifies this. Importantly, in doing so, the court has not
only relied on an economic principlewhich is beyond its domain of expertise,
but it has also rejected the need for an equitable division.
The following discussion progresses as follows: Section 1 analyses the
Supreme Court decisions in the Azadi Bachao Andolan and Vodafone cases,
to highlight how the decisions completely ignore the aspect of higher
revenue share and focusses only on supporting investments. Similarly, this
section also critically analyses the arguments adduced by the court to
support its decision to show how they lack legitimacy due to a lack of
reflecting shared values. In Section 2, the disparate elements of IEL,
especially ITL and International Development Law (IDL), as components
of International Economic Law (IEL) are discussed. This is done to
highlight the importance of coherence and thereby borrow into the
principles of IEL to support new practice. Therefore, this section also
analyses the way forward, by putting forth the requirements and
justifications in creating new practice. Here, the present system of
principles based laws within ITL is discussed, and the idea of
‘‘coherence’’17implicit to both ITL and IEL is explained. The discussion
14 Is used to refer to the transitory state of ITL, when compared to some of the other branches of IEL or
Public International Law. Also unsettled is used here in some ways to refer to the nature of the norm (non-
legal enforcement), and this is true of ITL. But, in such situations since it is the main transactors who
develop a norm, their choices are also bound to be reflected in such norms; refer to, David Charny, Illusions
of a Spontaneous Order: Norms in Contractual Relationships, 144 Univ Pennsylvania L Rev (1996) 1844–1845.
15 Bourdieu, supra note 12, 848.
16 Efficiency has been discussed very briefly in Section 3 (lowering the tax rates, thereby helping
investments get a better rate of return) while discussing ITL, but it should be clarified here that by avoiding
double taxation, the Double Taxation Agreements are seen as an efficiency enhancing instrument, and the
DTA does this as well. However, its ability to attract investments, singly, is suspect or unproven empirically,
and it is on this capability that the Supreme Court has relied; for a discussion on the ability of DTAs to
attract investments, refer to, Lisa E Sachs & Karl P Sauvant, BITs’, DTTs’, and FDI flows: An Overview, in,
Karl P Sauvant & Lisa E Sachs (eds) The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment
Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (OUP, Oxford, 2009) lix.
17 It means the justifications provided to the existing legal materials (statutes, decisions, and rules) by
principles, policies and purposes; refer to, Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 Boston Univ L Rev.
(1992), 284, 285. Also, a law is coherent if it could be explained by a consistent set of principles and policies;
refer to, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1996) 90–100, 294–327.
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also argues that pursuing efficiency singly to achieve higher investments
levels would not lead to higher tax collections or an equitable share.
Section 3 analyses the fault lines as seen from the discussion of the two
cases and the state of ITL. Apart from summoning a strong argument for
promoting practice through national courts based on the principle of
‘‘equity’’, it is argued that such a vision would also cohere with the
principle of ‘‘equity’’ borrowed from IEL, and the idea of ‘‘development’’
mentioned by the Supreme Court in the Azadi Bachao Andolan case as well.
2 Problematising the decisions
To recall some of the main observations made by the court in relation
to the two decisions, namely the Azadi Bachao Andolan and Vodafone
cases. The Azadi Bachao Andolan case relates to the misuse of the
Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) signed between India and
Mauritius. The misuse in question related to the use of the said
treaty by the nationals of third nations – treaty shopping. Hence the
key contention in this case was that third country nationals were not
entitled to the benefits of the Indo-Mauritius DTA. While considering
this argument, the Supreme Court held that it could not offer any
relief in such instances, unless a Limitation of Benefit (LoB) clause is
incorporated into the DTA by the respective states. Importantly, the
court also observed, ‘there is nothing like ‘‘equity’’ in a fiscal statute
[…], the statute applies proprio vigore or it does not’.18 The court
therefore declined to take up the responsibility of rectifying the law to
achieve equitable taxation.19
Also, the court clarified that several considerations could have played
a role in the negotiation of a tax treaty,20 or simply put – political
expediency. Although the court did not say that the Indo-Mauritius
treaty was aimed at promoting treaty shopping, but it impliedly accepts
this position. The court does this by accepting the position that the
promotion of trade and investment mentioned in the preamble to a
DTA has to be considered in interpreting the treaty.21 It is this
acceptance that allows the court to justify the impugned administrative
Circular (No.789 F.No.500/60/2000-FTD Government of India Ministry
18 Azadi Bachao Andolan, supra note 1, 29.
19 Ibid, 31, 32.
20 Ibid, 33.
21 Ibid, 33.
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of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Direct Taxes)
which clarified the meaning of ‘‘residence’’ under the Indo-Mauritius
DTA, and thereby enabled the treaty shoppers to take advantage of the
said DTA. Importantly, the court concludes that ‘‘treaty shopping’’ is
justified and could be tolerated because it helps attract foreign
investments and thereby ‘‘development’’.22
In the Vodafone Case, a Cayman Islands registered company transferred
its shares to Vodafone, a Dutch Company; due to this transfer, the Dutch
Company comes to hold shares of Mauritius registered companies which
in turn held shares of an Indian Company. The court at the outset itself
says that this case is not about treaty shopping but anti-avoidance.23 The
Revenue Authorities in India contended that although the sale happened
outside India, there was a taxable transfer of capital in India. However, the
court said that Section 9 (1) (i) of the Indian Income Tax Act of 1961
allowed for taxation of income deemed to accrue or deemed to arise in
India, and includes only income from direct transfer of capital assets
situated in India. Therefore, if a non-resident transfers assets within India,
the income from that would be classed as accruing within India, or by
Section 5(2) – it would be classed as income24 for tax purposes. However,
the court concluded that these provisions did not allow for the taxation of
‘‘–indirect transfers’’, as in the present case, although a capital transfer is
effected in India.25 Since the sale of shares happened outside the
‘‘territorial’’ confines of India, it did not give rise to a taxable incomewithin
India.26
Such an interpretation, the court says is essential for the attraction of FDI
and for efficiency – ‘‘certainty’’ of tax laws.27 It also said that a transaction (in-
flowof FDI) should be looked at in its entirety, hence the ‘‘look at’’ test is the
more appropriate one.28 Therefore, business structures for tax evasion and
genuine business purpose can be understood by looking at the duration for
which the holding structure exists, the timing of exit, the ‘‘taxable revenues’’
in India, the continuity of business upon exit, etc.29
22 Ibid, 34.
23 Vodafone, supra note 2, 39.
24 Ibid, 45 (The court concludes that this happens through a fiction as the receipt of such income is









But by looking at these two decisions, one question becomes
obvious. What are the overriding factors to be considered while
adjudicating on a dispute related to international taxation? Is it the
appropriateness of the test to be applied or the objectives of taxation
that takes primacy; should the issue of tax avoidance or treaty shopping
be applied in a way it suits the taxing jurisdiction; should such taxation
be seen as a facilitator of development; is the goal only to get maximum
investments at any cost? Similarly, a certain philosophy within these
decisions also becomes visible. First, primacy is being accorded to
foreign investors and investments, and yet argues for development.
Second, the court is unwilling to go beyond the paradigm of ‘‘efficiency’’
(an economic principle) in the interpretation and implementation of ITL
and ignores equity. Third, the court does not see itself as a lynchpin in
the creation of ITL and abdicates this role to the legislature.
As far as the Azadi Bachao Andolan case is concerned, there was not
much opposition to the decision from the businesses and tax
practitioners, unlike the decision of the High Court in the Vodafone
case, where it was found against Vodafone. Incidentally, in the Azadi
Bachao Andolan case the Supreme Court by upholding treaty shopping
has inadvertently upheld tax evasion utilising tax havens. However, it
should be remembered that tax evasion and the role played by the tax
havens in investments are opposed by the OECD and the UN. Yet,
there has been limited opposition to this decision which supports treaty
shopping via tax havens. But, although, the reasoning given by the
court for accepting ‘‘treaty shopping’’ is contentious, it is interesting -
developing countries could allow treaty shopping as it facilitates
‘‘development’’. Hence it is incumbent on us to understand the threads
of ‘‘development’’, ‘‘treaty shopping’’ and ‘‘tax avoidance’’ interwoven
into these decisions as well.
2.1 Analysing the philosophy of the court
First, while deciding in Azadi Bachao Andolan, the Supreme Court does
acknowledge that there is an outflow of revenue due to the non-
taxation/ taxability of the incomes generated from foreign invest-
ments.30 Yet, in both Azadi Bachao Andolan and Vodafone, relying on the
observation in an English case,31 the Supreme Court stresses (perhaps
30 Azadi Bachao Andolan, supra note 1, 132.
31 IRC v Duke of Westminster 1936 AC [1].
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correctly) that it is neither able to call such minimisation of taxes as
evasion (colourable)32 nor effect a change in policy, thereby showing its
adherence to the belief in ‘‘development’’ based on the smooth
(efficient) inflow of foreign investments.
Second, on the question of using tax havens to make investments; the
court in Azadi Bachao Andolan make no mention about it, although
Mauritius is a well-known tax haven. But, in Vodafone, the court clarified
that the present case was about tax avoidance, while the Azadi Bachao
Andolan was about treaty shopping. Here it is appropriate to ask; is there
any similarity between the two cases in ‘‘effect’’ and ‘‘operation’’? Well,
in the Azadi Bachao Andolan, a third person had used the opportunity
provided by the tax haven to create a structure and reduce tax
payments. Whereas, in Vodafone, a share transfer happens outside India
whereby it affects the ownership of an Indian subsidiary, and as a result
no taxes have to be paid in India. Thus, for a capital importer, both the
cases offer the same effect; yet the Supreme Court dismisses this as the
result of government policy. Therefore, in both these cases it is the
reduced incidence of taxation using a tax haven that is at the heart of
the issue – whether it is called as tax avoidance or treaty shopping.
Additionally, in the Vodafone case, the Court went further to explain
the logic to explain whether a structure is principally for avoidance and
hence an artificial device. To reach such a conclusion, the court set out
certain requirements; for example, the duration for which the holding
structure exists; the period of business operations in India; the
generation of taxable revenues in India; the timing of the exit; the
continuity of business on exit are all crucial in deciding the corporate
business purpose of a transaction.33 So, as long as a transaction is
‘‘preordained’’ it signals avoidance, and when the transaction is an
‘investment to ‘participate’ it would not be avoidance’.34 For this the
court relies on the ‘‘look at approach’’ (at the entire transaction), and the
court even goes on to suggest that the ‘‘taxable revenue’’ paid in India
could be a criterion. Yet, despite the best efforts by the court to explain
that a structure was not pre-ordained, a visible disconnect is evident
between the logic applied in the two decisions. Hence, it is important to
apply its formula to the facts in the Azadi Bachao Andolan case to better
understand this disconnect.
32 Azadi Bachao Andolan, supra note 1, 35.




Applying the formula – if the ‘‘taxable revenue’’ criterion from theVodafone
case is considered, this would contradict the decision in the Azadi Bachao
Andolan case because there was nil or next to no taxes paid in this latter.
Moreover since Foreign Institutional Investments (FII) is untaxed globally,
using theDTAwithMauritius does nothingmore (as in theAzadi case).Does
this mean that the transaction in Azadi Bachao Andolanwas tax avoidance or
was it not? In fact the court disregarded this issue completely behind the
development argument. It is therefore easy for one to see the incoherence in
the arguments laid by the same court on similarly structured transactions in
the two cases. Though it is difficult to say how the court could reach such a
formula, it is but reasonable for the court to say that every person has a right
to use legal methods to pay lower taxes and thus the Mauritius route.
Therefore, it is another thing for the court to conclude that the
Mauritius route was not used by the investor as part of a ‘‘preordained’’
transaction, but only as a method for investments to participate in India.
Such a conclusion seems plausible, only when the transaction is looked as
a whole, or from a country perspective to promote investments.
Importantly, the reasoning of the court to favour Vodafone shrinks to its
observation that the RevenueDepartment ‘‘vacillated’’35 and thus adopted
a ‘‘dissecting’’ and not a ‘‘look at approach’’. Hence the efficacy of this
formula for future application is attenuated. Also, a note of caution is in
order here; although the court does distinguish between Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and FII,36 perhaps it has not givenmuch thought to their
vastly different effects37 on tax revenues and hence for development.
This also makes it evident that the court has relied on an underlying
vision of ‘‘development’’, of virtually equating investments to develop-
ment. As a corollary of this belief, it also implies that investments would
happen only if they are ‘‘efficient’’ (certainty). But in reality, this also
means, investments to a state ‘‘Y’’ from state ‘‘X’’ would happen only if the
returns are above the rate what the investments could have derived in its
home state ‘‘X’’ or in another jurisdiction. This is controlled by the market
and it is questionable whether the court does have a role to play in this?
Third, the SupremeCourt has beenwilling to limit its role in the growth of
ITL; in the Azadi Bachao case the court said that unless there are LOB
provisions in the treaty, the court could not read such provisions into the
35 Ibid, 50.
36 Vodafone, supra note 2, 181.
37 Ruud A de Mooji & Sjef Ederveen, Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A Synthesis of Empirical
Research, 10 Intl Tax & Pub Finance (2003) 675.
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treaty to prevent its abuse. Similarly, in theVodafone case, the SupremeCourt
has said that the IncomeTaxAct does not tax indirect transfers and hence tax
was not payable. But, as would be seen in Section 3, the national courts have
a role to play in the development of International Tax Law. Therefore, from
the Vodafone case another conclusion is also possible; the Supreme Court has
followed the Azadi Bachao Andolan case to apply treaty as it is.
To better understand the ‘‘analysis’’ relied upon by the court in
arriving at its decision and also to understand whether the present ITL
favours countries such as India, an analysis of the fundamental
principles and structure of ITL is necessary. As is known, there is a
bit of economics, politics and law involved in the application of ITL,
and this happens because it is part of IEL. Thus an understanding of ITL
in relation to IEL becomes an imperative.
3 International economic (development & tax) laws
International Tax Law is part of International Economic Law38 and the
latter deals with the laws and customary practices that govern the
economic interactions between actors in different nations.39 So generally,
IEL is considered to subsume both the private and public international law
aspects.40 But more importantly, since the economic relations cover
disparate areas, the normative frameworks in the different areas are
interlinked and this calls for a holistic approach to the legal issues in
economic relations and should not be weighed down by any one of those
disparate areas.41 Thus from a legal standpoint, it is necessary to cultivate a
method to participate in the international economic order in a manner
which partakes of all the international economic legal frameworks,42 and
such an approach is still in its infancy. Nonetheless, it would be
uncontroversial to shape IEL from a chosen perspective from which it is
viewed or in relation to the international economic order. For, a
description of IEL also means how economic phenomena are perceived
and shaped – development of international economic order.43
38 Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary International Economic Law?, 32 German Yrbk Intl L (1989) 15.
39 Stephen Zamora, International Economic Law, 17 Univ Pennsylvania J Intl Econ L (1996) 63.
40 The concept of IEL can be conceived as a branch of Public International Law (narrow definition) and
also as including all branches of law concerned with the economic phenomena of international concern
(broad definition); refer to, Asif H Qureshi & Andreas R Ziegler, International Economic Law, 3rd edn (Sweet






Although international economic order can be analysed from
different perspectives, with globalisation a ‘‘welfare’’ perspective
becomes relatively more important. Since taxation and development
play a significant part in achieving welfare, it is important to understand
them within the whole or as elements of IEL. For example, ITL
concerns the national taxation of incoming and outgoing cross-border
transactions, it is part of IEL; thus an analysis of ITL generally or from a
particular perspective should cohere with the other elements of IEL as
well. Importantly, ITL also seeks to eliminate double taxation, as it can
burden the investor and the flow of trade. It also looks at the counter
point to this; the tax incentives provided to attract investments can
distort investments and thereby efficiency or ‘‘tax competition’’.44
Similarly, although ITL may be analysed from a development
perspective, and such a perspective should also cohere with efficiency.
If the different perspectives are all unified in a law, it means the law is
coherent and such a law is both neutral45 and fair.46
3.1 International development law
International Development Law (IDL), another aspect of IEL, looks into
the methods and laws to facilitate development. Although development
is mostly concerned with developing countries, the discourse on IDL
has involved the question of rights and duties states have in relation to
the development process. Yet, in relation to this development process,
consensus on two issues has been elusive – the rights and duties of
nations and ‘‘redistribution’’.47 However, IDL and the development
debate suffers from two shortcomings. First, there is a dearth of analysis
by writers from developing states focussing on the disparate areas of
44 The discourse on tax competition can have two strands of arguments – first, competition is generally
considered better because it helps lower prices and tax rates, but there is also a counter argument. The lower
taxes are offered by the capital importer and hence drives investments to places not on the basis of
comparative advantage, but on the basis of taxes – thereby being inefficient. Moreover, the capital importer
collecting lower taxes would lead to lower levels of development and force the other developing countries to
lower their taxes as well; hence we have ‘‘beggar thy neighbour arguments’’.
45 Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 L & Philosophy (1986) 253.
46 Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (Fontana, London, 1986) 219.
47 Qureshi & Ziegler, supra note 40, 617. Regarding redistribution this can happen only within a
community and that is because the society has helped those persons achieve through the contribution of the
other as well; refer to Alexander W Cappelen, he Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law, 15 Ethics &
Intl Aff (2001) 98. Thus in such societies inter-individual equity is the basis of tax division because through
such division there is redistribution – Nancy H Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income,
29 L & Pol Intl Bus (1997)152. But since there is no real redistribution in the present globalised economy and
hence evidence that a global community remains unrealised – Francois Bourguignon, Victoria Levin &
David Rosenblatt, International Redistribution of Income, 37 World Dev (2009) 7.
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IEL48; thus only areas of relevance to certain interests have been
highlighted. Consequently, as of yet, there is no constitution or
institutions for IDL. Therefore, the growth of a development perspec-
tive has been led by interests and biases within other areas of IEL
(notably trade).49
Second, although there has been some forwardmovement on the rights
and duties debate related to international development law, it still remains
inconclusive. This is largely because the present laws favour capital and
thus without the cooperation of the nation’s controlling it there would be
no forward movement in this debate. Even though the fundamental
yardstick of the need based rights is ‘‘entitlements’’,50 it is but important to
remember that the entitlements (discussed in the next section) in relation
to ITL are not need based, but rights linked to the territory. However, in
the present IDL discourse, ‘‘preferential treatment’’ has been adopted to
bridge the gap in the levels of development and its linkage to the ‘‘welfare
state’’51 has meant that meeting of the minimal human needs would be
sufficient. Consequently, this hasmeant that economic assistance /aid52 is
accepted as enabling the achievement of these minimal needs.
Globally, this has led to the growth of interventionist (top down)
policies to achieve development and thereby a sidelining of market
forces. As a result, the focus has not been on the content of
development law, but on a programmatic agenda.53 This resulted in
policies and programmes being hampered by a lack of financial
resources,54 and where implemented proved incapable of using the aid
effectively.55 Simply put, the lack of institutional or procedural justice
has hampered the development of substantive IDL as well. As would be
48 Qureshi & Ziegler, supra note 40, 620.
49 Ibid, 7.
50 Borrowing from the debates within the International Law of Development, where entitlements means
rights based on needs; refer to, Oscar Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15
Columbia J Transnatl L (1976) 10.
51 There are different variations of this concept, but the basic understanding is that the state responsibility
for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life through equality of
opportunity (social security benefits) and equitable distribution of wealth (progressive taxation).
52 With aid, the problem is that, it can be seen as a zero sum game because it is seen as a one-way process
and much of its benefits are whittled away by trade restrictions; refer to, Bourguignon et al, supra note 47, 3,
7.
53 This refers to the poverty alleviation programmes initiated by the International Financial Institutions;
refer to, Qureshi & Ziegler, supra note 40, 619.
54 Mohan Giles, Edward D Brown, Bob Milward & Alfred B Zack-Williams, Structural Adjustment: Theory,
Practice, Impacts (Routledge, London, 2000) 120.
55 David Dollar & Jakob Svensson, What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment
Programmes, 110 The Economic J (2000) 897.
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seen in the next section, ITL is still developing, and the state of the law
calls for a different approach to make it work for development. It is
therefore suggested that a better option is to borrow into the principle
of ‘‘duality of norms’’,56 which would enable the differential application
of laws to states on the basis of their levels of development. So this
section shows that the blind belief of the court in investment
automatically leading to development seems misplaced.
3.2 State of international tax laws
The principal source of ITL is the multitude of bilateral DTAs57 –
instruments designed to limit ‘‘double taxation’’.58 These DTAs owe
much of their provisions either to the UN or the OECD Model Tax
Conventions (MTC). Importantly, the MTCs contain mere standards59
rather than rules, whereby the meaning of these standards are uncertain
and require ‘‘interpretation’’.60 Consequently the meanings have to be
determined ex-post, by case law or a functional equivalent of case law.61
The principal role of a DTA is to limit the taxing power, or to divide
the taxes between the jurisdictions.62 These limits are reached through a
bargain before the conclusion of such treaties. Moreover, international
law does not prohibit double taxation, because jurisdiction to tax
unlimited as it is derived from sovereignty and this in turn is territorially
linked.63 But the working of ITL is slightly different in that it allows
extra-territorial taxation provided there is an economic/sufficient link
between the tax payer and the taxing state. This principle was
developed by the League of Nation’s Experts (Experts)64 to divide the
56 A key concept to understanding the background to a legal definition of a developing country is the
duality of norms; refer to, Guglielmo Verdirame, The Definition of Developing Countries under GATT and
other International Law, 39 German Yrbk Intl L (1996) 166.
57 Klaus Vogel, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 Intl Tax 7 Business Lawyer (1986) 7. (none)
58 There are two types: ‘‘juridical’’, where the same tax payer is taxed in two jurisdictions on the same
subject matter and ‘‘economic’’ when the same economic transaction is taxed in two jurisdictions during the
same period but to different persons.
59 Although only the OECD MTC is considered, the same would apply to the UN MTC as well; refer to,
Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Global Proposal for Simplification, 59 Tax L (2006)
944.
60 John A Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of
Taxation, 68 Washington L Rev (1993) 16.
61 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J (1992) 560.
62 Vogel, supra note 57, 8.
63 Asif H Qureshi, The Freedom of a State to Legislate in Fiscal Matters under General International Law,
41 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (1987) 14.
64 League of Nations, Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee – Economic and
Financial Commission, League of Nations, Doc. E.F.S.73.F.19 (1923) 20.
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total income between the competing states according to the investor’s
economic interest under each authority. Four considerations were taken
into account to explain this principle,65 and of these the experts gave
‘‘primacy’’66 to the place of origin of the wealth and residence of the
owner of the wealth.
Without delving into the historical reasons for the present rules or
the conclusion reached by the Experts, it is important to focus on the
principles that help divide international taxes. First, the principles of
‘‘source’’ and ‘‘residence’’ - they play a crucial role both in the division of
international taxes and for ‘‘rulings on double taxation’’.67 A ‘‘source’’
state means one where the actual activity from which the income
generated happens, or where value is added to the good.68 In fact there
could be various factors that adds value or causes increase in wealth and
labelling one of them as ‘‘source’’ is a juridical act.69 On the other hand,
a ‘‘residence’’ state means the state where the tax payer is normally
resident or domiciled. But in bilateral treaties, source is allowed to tax
(Art 23 A and B of the Model Conventions) because a deduction or
exemption is allowed by the resident state. Therefore, it would not be
wrong to accede to the view that the ‘tax payers residence is given the
exclusive or primary right to tax income while the source has little or no
right to tax such income’.70 Apart from the historical fact of the few
states involved in international investments, a plausible reason could be
the ‘desire of the Experts to ensure the application of progressive
income taxes to the world-wide income streams of the tax payer’.71 This
seems plausible, because the Experts had admitted that the ‘lack of
reciprocal flows between the treaty partners due to the differing levels
of development could only be rough justice’.72 But, if there are
65 Ibid, 22–23; the place of –- a) acquisition of wealth (where wealth originates); b) location of wealth
(situs of wealth); c) enforceability of rights to wealth (place providing legal apparatus to rights regarding
wealth) and d) consumption of wealth (place or residence/domicile of the investor).
66 Ibid, 25.
67 Klaus Vogel, State of Residence May As Well Be State of Source – There is no Contradiction, 59 Bull
Intl Fisc Doc (2005) 420.
68 Klaus Vogel, World-wide vs Source Taxation of Income – A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments,
(Part - I), 8-9 Intertax, (1988) 225. This definition is slightly different from the notion espoused by the Experts;
source means origin of wealth and residence means where the wealth is spent; refer to, League of Nations,
supra note 62, 23.
69 Vogel, supra note 67, 420.
70 Charles R Irish, International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, 23 Intl &
Comp L Q (1974) 293.
71 Cockfield, supra note 5, 203.
72 Hence the Experts had called for reciprocal exemption of the tax payers from each jurisdiction; refer to,
League of Nations, supra note 62, 42–51.
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reciprocal flows of income between the treaty partners, then the
principle used whether it is source or residence is neutral.73
Second, a principle related to source and residence – ‘‘efficiency’’ needs
understanding. Any tax in cross-border transactions would pose questions
of efficiency, but a ‘‘theoretical agreement’’74 on an optimal tax for such
transactions has been unachievable to date. But, it is important to explain
the principle of ‘‘efficiency’’ that is being spoken here. Here ‘‘efficiency’’
refers to the allocation of resources to the place where it derives the
maximum returns, and not where it is most productive. Thus, despite
incentives or tax holidays distorting production efficiencies,75 it does help
to attract FDI.76 Moreover, the benefits for the capital exporters to invest
abroad outweigh the benefits of investing within national boundaries.77
Additionally, since outward and inward investments are not in compe-
tition with each other,78 generally the Residence State offers tax credit
based on ‘‘equity’’ between its resident tax payers79 for the income they
make either nationally or internationally (horizontal equity).
Thus, we arrive at a cognate concept of efficiency called –
neutrality,80 on which the present tax division heavily relies. Efficient
investments also mean that they should be neutral, meaning it should
not be tax differentials that decide investment choices. As Vogel says, it
is almost like saying that taxes should have no impact on investments –
a practical impossibility.81 But, when ‘‘neutrality’’82 of investments is
73 Irish, supra note 70, 295.
74 Michael Keen & David Wildasin, Pareto-Efficient International Taxation, 94 Am Econ Rev (2004) 259.
75 Alex Easson & Eric M Zolt, Tax Incentives, World Bank Institute (2002) [34]\http://www.derecho.
usmp.edu.pe/postgrado/maestrias/maestria_derecho_tributario/materiales/ciclo1/analisis_economico_
impuestos/material/15_%20EassonZoltPaper.pdf[.
76 Even here the relationship is not clear cut; it works best for Multi-National Corporations from nations
which give tax exemptions on foreign income; refer to, Alexander Klemm & Stefan Van Parys, Empirical
Evidence on the Effects of Tax Incentives, WP/09/136 IMF Working Paper (2009) [21]\https://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09136.pdf[.
77 Michael J Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L Rev (2001) 286.
78 Ibid, 290.
79 Kaufman, supra note 45, 152.
80 Global neutrality is impossible to achieve and masks the protection of specific domestic interests; refer
to, Tsilly Dagan, The Costs of International Tax Cooperation, Working Paper No 1-03, (January 2003) [3]
\http://www.biu.ac.il/law/unger/working_papers/1-03.pdf[.
81 Klaus Vogel, Worldwide vs Source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of arguments – II,
Intertax (1998) 314. Similarly, the reasons for World-wide taxation have been generally accepted; refer to,
Vogel, supra note 66, 220.
82 Related to international taxation there are two neutralities: Capital Export and Capital Import. The
former means taxes on exporters of capital from a country should be neutral so that the choice to invest
abroad or at home is not based on taxes on income. The latter means investments in one country should be
subjected to the same tax treatment.
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analysed, it is again seen as being linked to ‘‘equity’’ amongst the tax
payers within the capital exporting countries.83 In fact, efficiency and
economic allegiance as espoused by the Experts is also premised on
inter-individual equity (progressive taxation).84 Yet, in the literature
(especially legal) there is seldom any discussion about ‘‘equity’’.85 It is
important to remind the reader that inter-individual equity and the
equity referred here are different. The former is intra-national and
promotes world-wide (residence) taxation, and the latter is inter-nation
equity promoting source taxation. But, as with all questions of fairness,
it has been difficult to arrive at a consensus on the ‘‘normative’’
foundations for an equitable division of international taxes.86 This is not
to say that there has been no discussion for an ‘‘equitable’’ division of
international taxes, especially with calls for ‘‘inter-nation equity’’87 (varies
with income – vertical equity). The Musgraves also say that the use of
legal principles like ‘‘residence’’ and ‘‘source’’ has made an equitable di-
vision of taxes further difficult, because the economists are inclined to
view such division as a national loss or gain.88 Importantly, ‘‘inter-nation
equity’’ does help to highlight the context (sharing of revenues with the
source state89) of its use, when national interests conflict.90
But, it should be reiterated here that international income is a ‘‘pie-
concept’’91 (the production of Multinational Corporations happens with
inputs from different states), where a neat division may be difficult.
Therefore, as mentioned earlier, it is inequitable to persist with
‘‘residence’’ and its principal right to tax international income.
Moreover, the primacy of residence is based on inter-individual equity
which has limited application in a globalised economy.92 Importantly,
the provisions of the MTCs or DTAs do not call for a fair division of
taxes. Additionally, the lack of an institutional structure means that the
83 Kaufman, supra note 47, 152.
84 League of Nations, supra note 64, 20.
85 Cockfield, supra note 5, 200.
86 Klaus Vogel, Worldwide vs Source taxation of income – A review and Re-evaluation of Arguments –
III, 11 Intertax (1998) 393.
87 Richard A Musgrave & Peggy B Musgrave, Inter-nation Equity, in, Richard M Bird & John G Head
(eds) Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S Shoup (University of Toronto Press, Canada, 1972) 63.
88 Ibid, 72.
89 Ibid, 69.
90 Mitsuo Sato & Richard Bird, International Aspects of the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders,
22 Staff Papers – International Monetary Fund (1975) 421– 423.
91 Richard A Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (McGraw-Hill
Company, Singapore, 1989) 568.
92 Kaufman, supra note 47, 152–153.
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‘‘procedural’’ element of fairness is also missing. But, as mentioned
earlier, it is possible for the courts (in developing countries) to intervene
and decide where the value was added.
Thus we have reached a point of explaining why an equitable division of
international tax revenues should not be bogged down by questions related
to the normative (value judgements) foundations, thereby leading to
questions of rights andduties. Thepower to tax is attached to a territory as of
right, although that could be disputed by another state; or it is an
‘‘entitlement’’.93 These entitlements can be considered as ‘‘rights’’ in a limited
sense, because they entitle you to make claims and are protected by law.94
Every territory which enjoys sovereignty enjoys inalienable entitlements95;
they can only be lost either voluntarily or due to the force of the moral
argument of the other. In fact, the Experts considered96 economic allegiance
(reasonable link) as reflecting entitlements and saw it as being separate from
territory. But the fact remains that economic allegiance is merely a method
tomake taxationmore effective andnot a limitationon jurisdiction.97This is
precisely the reason why there is no general rule of international law to
avoid double taxation, unless there is a treaty. It is therefore visible that
international tax division does not cohere with an equitable division based
on entitlements. Therefore, there is a case tomake equity a core principle in
the division of international tax division. Such a divisionwould not be based
on the rights and duties debate, but on a re-examination of the inalienable
rights lost in the evolutionary growth of the present tax laws.
4 The way forward: coherence of tax laws
Finally, before we can achieve the objective of making ‘‘equity’’ as a
fundamental principle of international tax division through practice,
three issues require clarification. First, there is a need to create practice
or understand the methods available to do it. Second, there is a need to
understand the likely problems while interpreting international tax laws.
Third, there ought to be coherence between such practice and the
objectives sought by a state entering a DTA.
93 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London, 1996) 188.
94 Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 Columbia Law Review
(1982) 1114.
95 Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 Harvard L Rev (1972) 1092.
96 League of Nations, supra note 62, 47.
97 Qureshi, supra note 63, 19.
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First, as discussed earlier, since the treaties rely on the present tax
rules and principles, extensive negotiation would be required to infuse
equity as a tax principle. Similarly, efforts at the UN has not found much
success that too cannot deliver in the short term. Hence adjudication is
undoubtedly the best bet to create practice.
Second, as there is no global tax adjudicatory body, the national
courts are sought to play this role. However, when national courts
adjudicate they have to encounter the criticism of bias; hence the rules
for interpreting such treaties also become important. Thus an idea
about some of the problems of interpreting an international tax treaty is
handy because our aim is to infuse the principle of ‘‘equity’’ anew and
this would also help justify such an infusion.
Since many bilateral tax treaties are incorporated into the domestic
laws, the same laws are applied globally. These bilateral treaties are
based on model tax conventions. Although the commentaries and
guidelines related to the model provisions are supplementary to the
main texts, they still form part of the interpretative material to these
treaties.98 Importantly, the commentaries or guidelines to these MTCs
are specific and more practical, and unlike the text they are not abstract
but refer to concrete situations.99 This overlaid nature of the basic text
to these treaties is in addition to the local laws related to taxation; this
situation calls for specialist skills100 to understand these relationships
and to find an interpretation that favours the cause of particular nations.
As mentioned earlier, despite the existence of treaties, the principles
or standards inhering in them would require interpretation to expound
them through case law or otherwise. But, indeterminacy of the laws can
afflict any such interpretative exercise. First, language is socially
constructed through interactions and the social context.101 Thus the
meaning can vary according to the linguistic contexts and may have to
be settled through contests. Second, when laws are in the form of broad
principles, it leads to uncertain regulation.102 Moreover, as these
principles (laws) are applied to achieve economic purposes like taxes,
98 Sol Picciotto, Indeterminacy, Complexity, Technocracy and the Reform of International Corporate
Taxation, 24 S& L S (2015) 166.
99 Ibid, 167.
100 Ibid.
101 Sol Picciotto, Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and Regulatory State, 29 L & Policy
(2007) 15.
102 Principles are more influential in situations that require flexibility and rules for predictability. But
principles could reduce uncertainty if they cohere with the other principles; refer to, Joseph Raz, Legal
Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 Yale L J (1972), 838, 842.
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there is an increasing tendency to comply with the letter rather than
spirit/ creative compliance (for instance treaty shopping) of the law.103
Third, these principles being norms, they involve a value judgement104
and therefore should depend on the shared values (fair) and purposes
that underlie the principle. This has implications for understanding
creative compliance as well because such compliance could be the result
of a differing view of the values it aims to promote.105 These views
about indeterminacy could help better analyse the processes involved in
the creation of these tax laws and the behaviour of nations.
First, the OECD, the club of capital exporters, has been the main actor
in the creation of the present tax rules. Thus the capital exporters were
willing to enter into tax treaties on terms which benefit them. Second, as
mentioned at the outset, there has been limited participation by much of
the capital importers (developing countries) in themaking of ITL. Yet, this
has not held back coordination between the capital exporting and
importing nations using these laws, and this despite the ‘symbolic power
in the text’106 having been captured by the capital exporters (through
principles like ‘‘efficiency’’ and primacy of ‘‘residence’’). Therefore, the
laws and the commentaries have been presented as principled interpre-
tation of the accepted texts or these principles have been shown to
‘‘cohere’’ with the texts and its objectives. Importantly, this has also helped
bestow legitimacy to these laws.107 Thus the objective of creating practice
and promoting ‘‘equity’’ as a principle is to include the views of a larger
group of nations and therefore to capture the power.
Second, to look at the objectives behind such a principle, the
objective of a DTA is said to be the avoidance of double taxation and
information exchange. But as the court has opined in the Azadi Bachao
Andolan case, the developing countries can view DTAs as an instrument
for ‘‘development’’ as well. As mentioned earlier, the Model Tax
Conventions contain broad principles which need explication through
case laws. This also implies that the considerations while determining a
principle is not limited or arises because that principle is inherently
so.108 For instance, if one is looking at Art 3 (2) of the MTCs, the
103 Picciotto, supra note 96, 170.
104 Lon L Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harvard L Rev (1958) 670.
105 Picciotto, supra note 96, 173.
106 Bourdieu, supra note 10, 818.
107 Here legitimacy means the stability and the capability to change progressively; refer to, Franck, supra
note 11, 7.
108 Kaplow, supra note 61, 589.
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implication of range of consideration would become clear – ‘[a]s regards
the application of this convention…. any term not defined therein shall,
unless the context otherwise require, have the meaning that it has at the
time under the law of that state for the purposes of the taxes to which the
convention applies’. Hence the courts should be aware that the ambit of
principles being wide, it would make the measurement of compliance
difficult – implying compliance with the letter. It would therefore not be
wrong to say that such compliance is seen in these two cases as well
(using tax havens to reduce tax payments). Hence, although the court is
supportive of investments for development, it should also be aware that
this need not per se leads to higher taxes.
Importantly, new practice also gains legitimacy if such practice can be
explained as achieving the objectives set to be achieved by a state while
entering the tax treaty. Generally, there is an unsubstantiated belief that
DTAs help attract investments, and therefore nations enter into DTAs.
But it is worth remembering that investments include both FDI and FII
and the latter remains untaxed because of its mobile nature. Similarly in
economic theory, especially Keynesians109 believe that tax cuts would
lead to investments, leading to higher incomes which would then
induce savings to fuel further reinvestments. This policy has been
pursued by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank110 as well
and had to be subsequently altered.111 Therefore, a blind adherence to
the attraction of investments by interpreting a DTA by its letter rather
than spirit would not lead to development.
Third, by supporting a division based on equity – would that lead to
laws based on shared values? As seen earlier, present discussions about
‘‘equitable’’ division have been lost on the question of value added in a
particular jurisdiction. Although such questions have been discussed
they have been termed as being factual (example transfer pricing issues
– it is difficult to exactly pin point which jurisdiction has added what
amount of profit and all formulas have been proven to be unworkable).
Looking at the decisions in the Azadi Bachao Andolan and Vodafone cases,
it would not be wrong to infer that the court was unwilling to upset the
MNCs. Thus although a formulaic sharing of taxes will elude immediate
resolution, it is not a question to be pursued in the short term. On the
109 Beryl W Sprinkel, Role of Monetary-Fiscal Policies, Increasing Understanding of Public Problems and
Policies, Policies (1963) 15\http://econpapers.repec.org/article/agsiuppap/default13.htm[.
110 Peter Gibbon, The World Bank and the new politics of aid, 5 European J Dev Research (1993) 37.
111 World Bank, World Development Report 1999–2000: Entering the 21st Century The Changing Development
Landscape (OUP, New York, 2000) 25, 200–210.
78 Ajay Kumar
123
contrary, the national courts would be better equipped to explain
whether an ‘‘equitable’’ division would cohere with the purpose
(development) for which a state enter a DTA and also the objectives
that IEL aspires to achieve.
First, there is the scarcely discussed question of entitlements and this
justifies a larger share to the developing countries. Second, there is a lot
of tax evasion and double non-taxation happening; thus, there is a larger
divisible pool of revenues. Third, since there is no factual link between
investments and the signing of a DTA, and by creating practice the
developing countries would emphasise the ‘‘developmental’’ aspirations
for signing a DTA. Importantly, such an ‘‘equitable’’ division while
cohering with development would also cohere with ‘‘efficiency’’ because
the idea is only to raise additional revenues through reduced tax evasion
or double non-taxation. In fact, an argument of ‘‘development’’ was
fleetingly mentioned by the court in the Azadi Bachao Andolan case but
ignored in the Vodafone case. Therefore, by relying on ‘‘equity’’ from a
development perspective it would help promote shared values or ‘‘inter-
nation’’ equity.
5 Conclusion
An analysis of the above-mentioned decisions, and even as per the
existing national rules it may be difficult to say that the Supreme Court
has erred. However, there are serious questions that need further
examination. First, even a cursory reading of the two decisions is bound
to bring out contradictions in its formula to distinguish tax evasion. In
the first case, the court found in favour of the MNC to indulge in
limited tax evasion (treaty shopping has an element), because the
investments routed into the national economy were interpreted as
effecting development. In the second case, the court relies on the
limited judicial anti-avoidance rule (lifting the corporate veil) available
in India and finds against tax evasion, and yet again favouring the MNC.
Similarly, it propounds the amount of taxes paid as a yardstick in this
formula. However, as shown in Section 1, it is not impossible to
challenge this reasoning.
Second, as a national court administering ITL, the Supreme Court has
failed on two accounts. First, it has shown scant understanding of the
intermeshed nature of the national and international tax laws and its
own role in the development of ITL. Second, it has relied on the
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economic principle of ‘‘efficiency’’ and thereby investments to the total
exclusion of an ‘‘equitable’’ division of taxes. Yet, it has unwittingly
relied on development to justify treaty shopping. Similarly, arriving at
an interpretation favouring ‘‘development’’ in the Azadi Bachao Andolan
case, without any justifications is ‘‘incoherent’’ for two reasons. First,
there is an avowed understanding within the international tax regime to
limit treaty shopping and the use of tax havens. Second, the
development espoused by the court is premised on efficiency of
investments which may not favour the revenue interests of the capital
importer per se. Thus, there is a failure to appreciate how a ‘‘legitimate’’
law or legal argument may be constructed to circumvent the efficiency
principle.
Third, the court outrightly rejects ‘‘equity’’ in fiscal laws. In fact,
‘‘equity’’ or a division based on ‘‘equity’’ would only mean a division that
takes the territorial claims or the ‘‘rights’’ more seriously – as foregone
entitlements. Moreover, it would also emphasise and clarify the
‘‘context’’ in which international tax division should be understood and
interpreted (especially when developing countries are involved) by
courts. Above all, International Tax Law is an element of International
Economic Law, and ‘equity’ is well entrenched in both IEL and its other
elements. Since cases are envisioned as a method to develop ITL, and in
the absence of an international tax court, the national courts play an
integral part in this process. Thus, the Supreme Court was well within
its bounds to borrow into the principle of ‘‘equity’’ from IEL, as that
would have cohered with the principles of IEL.
Certainly these two disputes were opportunities for the Supreme
Court to create practice favouring ‘‘development’’ or ‘‘equity’’ and
thereby a developing country perspective. But its failure to capitalise on
this situation should not been seen as an absolute failure either. The
academic community may well have some questions to answer.
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